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ARTICLES
BROADENING LOW-WAGE WORKERS‟ ACCESS
TO JUSTICE: GUARANTEEING UNPAID WAGES
IN TARGETED INDUSTRIES
Hina B. Shah*
I. INTRODUCTION
Fei Yi Chen worked alongside her mother at Win Fashion, one of
three garment factories owned and operated by Toah Quan and Anna
Wong.1 She sat on a box on top of her wooden chair to adjust to the
height of her sewing machine.2 The factory had no windows and poor
* Associate Professor of Law and Clinical Staff Attorney, Women‟s Employment Rights
Clinic, Golden Gate University School of Law. I am grateful to Jason Bent, Eric Christiansen,
Roberto Corrado, Charlotte Garden, Timothy Glynn, Tristin Green, Bill Hoerger, Michele
Benedetto Neitz, Stephen Rich, Catherine Ruckelshaus, Marci Seville, Charles Sullivan, Rachel
Van Cleave, Rebecca White, and Michael Zimmer for their thoughtful comments and
encouragement on earlier drafts. Thanks to Nancy McGee for research assistance. This article was
selected for the Seton Hall Fourth Annual Employment & Labor Law Scholars‟ Forum, January
2010. This project was supported by the Golden Gate University Law School Summer Research
Grant.
1. Bradstreet v. Wong, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253, 256 (Ct. App. 2008); Interview by Russell
Jeung with Fei Yi Chen, The Loss of the Garment Industry is Part of a Cycle: An Interview with Fei
Yi Chen, Community Organizer for the Chinese Progressive Association, CHINESE AM.: HIST. &
PERSP. 65, 65 (2008) [hereinafter Jeung]. The garment industry is structured as a pyramid, with a
few large retailers at the top, selling billions of dollars in garments, followed by the second tier of
garment manufacturers who sell and distribute finished garments to retailers and often design the
clothes, and finally the sewing contractors. See Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor
Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of
Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 997 (1999). Historically, garment manufacturers have
contracted out their in-house production work to sewing contractors, whose function generally is to
sew, press, and finish the cut fabric according to the patterns and instructions provided by the
manufacturers. Id. at 997. The sewing contractors staff their garment factories with unskilled and
cheap labor, often immigrant, non-English speaking women, to perform the work for the
manufacturers. See id. at 995-96; Jeung, supra, at 65. The pyramid structure ensures rampant wage
and hour violations. See Goldstein et al., supra, at 996-98.
2. Jeung, supra note 1, at 65.
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ventilation indoors.3 She got paid by the number of pieces of clothing
she sewed, and if she failed to meet her quota for the day, she had to
clock out and continue working.4 Fei Yi Chen worked for the largest
garment manufacturer in the San Francisco Bay area. In addition to Win
Fashion, Wong and Quan owned and operated two other factories, all
closely-held corporations.5 The Wins factories employed approximately
three hundred garment workers, all monolingual Chinese immigrants
like Fei Yi Chen.6
In 2001, the factories faced serious financial problems. Wong and
Quan knew that they could not pay their workers but nonetheless
continued to operate the factories.7 They engaged in an elaborate
scheme to mask the nonpayment of wages.8 For example, they
personally instructed workers to delay cashing their paychecks, issued
only pay stubs without corresponding checks, gave unsigned, and
therefore, nonnegotiable paychecks, and issued paychecks that bounced.9
The workers, despite not being paid any wages, continued to work at the
factories.10 On a foggy morning in the summer of 2001, investigators
from the federal Department of Labor and the state labor agency, the
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, commonly known as the
Labor Commissioner, raided the Wins factories.11 Amidst mounting
pressure from creditors and the pending labor investigations, Wong and
Quan padlocked the factories and declared bankruptcy.12 The workers
abruptly found themselves out of work.13
The DOL quickly entered into a settlement agreement with the
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 256. While no one definition exists for close corporations,
there is general agreement that a close corporation has a small number of shareholders who have a
substantial portion of their wealth invested in the corporation, are intimately involved in the
management of the corporation, and seek to restrict membership in the corporation. FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 228-29
(1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1151
(1989).
6. Statement of Decision and Judgment, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 606, Bradstreet, 75
Cal. Rptr. 3d (Nos. A113760, A114106); Jeung, supra note 1, at 65.
7. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257.
8. See id.
9. Transcript on Appeal at 329, 455, 867, Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d (Nos. A113760,
A114106); Trial Exhibit 86, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 127; Trial Exhibit 87,
reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 128.
10. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257. Wong and Quan misled the workers into believing
that they had to be working in order to recover any owed wages. Transcript on Appeal, supra note
9, at 262-63.
11. See Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 258.
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owners for violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”).14 Unfortunately, the agency‟s settlement fell far short of
what the workers were owed. The DOL settled for approximately fifty
cents on the dollar.15 The Labor Commissioner pursued a separate
lawsuit against the owners under state wage and hour laws.16
Unsatisfied with the DOL process, the Chinese Progressive
Association—a community-based organization—and two former
employees intervened in the state lawsuit.17 California wage and hour
regulations define an employer as “any person . . . who directly or
indirectly . . . exercises control over the wages, hours, or working
conditions of any person.”18 The lawsuit sought to hold Wong and Quan
liable under this regulatory definition.19 After a four-month bench trial,
the court issued a tentative decision, finding Quan and Wong personally
liable to the workers for one million dollars in unpaid wages and
penalties.20 However, the trial court did not enter judgment in favor of
the workers because of the intervening California Supreme Court
decision, Reynolds v. Bement.21
In Reynolds, the Supreme Court of California held that the
regulatory definition of employer could not be applied in civil actions
under the California Labor Code because the legislature had not “clearly
14. Statement of Decision and Judgment, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 60910. The Fair Labor Standards Act sets standards for minimum wages, maximum hours, and
overtime law. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206-207 (2006).
15. See David Lazarus, Garment Pact Called a Rip-Off, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 2003, at B1
(noting that the Wins‟ former clients agreed to pay $337,000 to the workers, and that Quan and
Wong agreed to pay $213,000). The owners never paid the DOL judgment. Transcript on Appeal,
supra note 9, at 1112.
16. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257. Congress specified that the FLSA was not to displace
any state laws that provided greater protections than the existing federal standard. 29 U.S.C. § 218;
see Brennan v. New Jersey, 364 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D.N.J. 1973). At the time of the violations,
California‟s wage and hour laws provided far greater protection to workers than under the FLSA.
The California minimum wage was $6.25, compared to the FLSA‟s at $5.15. Compare History of
California
Minimum
Wage,
CAL.
DEP‟T
OF
INDUS.
REL.,
http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/MinimumWageHistory.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2010), with History of
Changes to the Minimum Wage Laws, U.S. DEP‟T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/coverage.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2010). In addition, California provides overtime for all hours
worked beyond the eight-hour workday.
Overtime, CAL. DEP‟T OF INDUS. REL.,
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/FAQ_Overtime.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
17. See Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 256. The Women‟s Employment Rights Clinic
(WERC) of Golden Gate University School of Law represented the workers and the community
organization. I worked on the case while at WERC as a Visiting Professor and was lead counsel on
the appeal.
18. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11010(2)(F) (2010).
19. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257-58.
20. Id. at 258.
21. Id. (citing Reynolds v. Bement, 116 P.3d 1162 (Cal. 2005)).
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manifested” its intent to apply the definition to the Labor Code.22 Since
the Labor Code was silent as to the definition of “employer,” the court
held that common-law agency principles governed the liability of
individual corporate actors.23 As a result of Reynolds, Wong and Quan
escaped liability.24 The trial court had ruled against the Wins workers on
their veil piercing theory.25 After a seven year struggle, the Wins
garment workers had no recourse against the owners, despite their direct
involvement in the unlawful conduct.
The California Supreme Court‟s decisions in Reynolds and
Martinez v. Combs26 are not anomalies. They are part of a broader trend
among the state judiciary to curb legislative attempts to exempt wages
from the limited liability rule.27 The Supreme Courts of Nevada and
Colorado struck down their respective wage and hour definitions,
holding corporate officers and agents not personally liable.28 These
decisions fully embraced limited liability as the bedrock of the
corporation, and required the legislature to manifest extraordinary intent
to override traditional corporate law, despite explicit statutory
language.29
Yet, unlimited liability has not always been viewed as such an
extraordinary privilege.30 The idea that shareholders and other corporate
actors should be held personally responsible for corporate acts and
obligations had widespread support in America well into the nineteenth
century.31 In the last decade, a robust academic discourse has been
22. See Reynolds, 116 P.3d at 1169.
23. Id. (“Under the common law, corporate agents acting within the scope of their agency are
not personally liable for the corporate employer‟s failure to pay its employees‟ wages.”). But see
Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 276-77, 279 (Cal. 2010) (holding that the regulatory definition of
employer did apply to proceedings under the Labor Code, but did not reach individual corporate
agents acting within the scope of their agency).
24. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 258-59 (holding that under the common-law definition of
“employer,” Wong and Quan were not personally liable for unpaid wages and penalties).
25. See id. at 259 (noting that the workers claimed that Wong and Quan were the alter ego of
the corporations). The trial court also did not find personal liability under any of the other statutory
theories, including the California unfair competition law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West
2008), and California Labor Code provisions specifically governing the garment industry. See
Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 259.
26. 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010).
27. See, e.g., Leonard v. McMorris, 63 P.3d 323, 326 (Colo. 2008); Boucher v. Shaw, 196
P.3d 959, 960 (Nev. 2008).
28. Leonard, 63 P.3d at 326; Boucher, 196 P.3d at 960.
29. See Leonard, 63 P.3d at 329-30, 332; Boucher, 196 P.3d at 963.
30. See generally Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious
Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 337-38 (2004) (claiming that in the
early 1800s, limited liability was not the main benefit of incorporation).
31. See id. at 338 (stating that limited liability was not necessarily provided by all states as a
privilege of incorporation until the end of the nineteenth century).
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taking place over the value of limited liability.32 There has been some
recognition that limited liability places an unfair burden on some
creditors.33 Numerous commentators have recommended reworking
limited liability for tort victims.34 The plight of the wage creditors,
however, has been missing from the academic discourse. Wage
creditors share some of the same structural problems as tort creditors.35
They are involuntary creditors who have little bargaining power, and
even less access to information to assess corporate risks.36
In addition, low-wage workers face unique challenges not shared by
other creditors. Low-wage workers comprise one-third of the overall
workforce.37 They work in industries with rampant wage and hour
violations.38 A comprehensive survey of low-wage industries in New
32. See, e.g., id. at 361 (discussing the academic discourse over limited liability).
33. See Daniel R. Kahan, Note, Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts: A Historical
Perspective, 97 GEO. L.J. 1085, 1090-91 (2009). See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1920
(1991) (noting that shareholders of a corporation that experiences financial difficulty may seek to
drain the firm‟s assets before contract creditors can levy on them). There are essentially voluntary
and involuntary creditors. A voluntary creditor enters into contracts with the corporations and is
assumed to have been aware of the risks of injury involved in dealing with the corporation. See id.
at 1920-21. “Involuntary creditors constitute a residual category: those to whom the corporation is
indebted on a non-contractual basis, as in the case of a victim of a corporate tort.” Kahan, supra, at
1090 n.24. Workers fall somewhere in between. Employment is a contractual relationship, but
structurally workers share the same characteristics as involuntary creditors.
34. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 30, at 416; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 1880;
Kahan, supra note 33, at 1109-10; David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims and Creditors,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1626-27 (1991); Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1271 (2002); Robert B.
Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants
for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1994); Note, Should Shareholders Be
Personally Liable for the Torts of their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1196 (1967).
35. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 618
(1986) (“Most employees and retail consumers and many trade creditors must properly be viewed as
involuntary creditors. Consequently, the group adversely affected by limited liability is much larger
than a group comprised only of tort claimants.”).
36. See generally id. at 616-20 (discussing the unfairness of limited liability protection for
employees and labor claimants).
37. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC‟Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP‟T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., WHO ARE LOW-WAGE WORKERS? (2009) [hereinafter WHO ARE LOW-WAGE
WORKERS?], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/LowWageWorkers/rb.pdf. Low-wage workers
are defined as those that fall below the poverty line for a family of four, even if they worked fulltime, full-year. Id.
38. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA‟S CITIES 5-6 (2009), available at
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1; Cynthia Estlund,
Who Mops the Floors at the Fortune 500? Corporate Self-Regulation and the Low-Wage
Workplace, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 671, 673 (2008). In fiscal year 2008, the Department of
Labor alone collected more than $57.5 million in back wages in nine targeted low-wage

14

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:9

York, Chicago, and Los Angeles recently found that more than 1.1
million workers across these cities were deprived of $56.4 million of
wages every week because of employment and labor law violations.39
The limited liability regime leaves these workers with very little
recourse when corporations file for bankruptcy, as they are increasingly
doing.40 Workers can either rely on the stringent common-law veil
piercing doctrine—a vague and confusing area of the law that courts are
reluctant to utilize absent extraordinary circumstances—or statutory
exceptions. The FLSA has a broad definition of “employer,” holding
corporate individuals liable under certain circumstances.41 However, the
FLSA falls far short of providing comprehensive coverage to all workers
due to its coverage limits and broad exemptions. In addition, the FLSA
definition focuses primarily on the control exercised by the corporate
individuals.42 In the highly stratified Wal-Mart economy, many
industries like garment rely on sub-contracting, diffusing control over
several layers.43 Furthermore, FLSA‟s enforcement mechanisms are
ineffective to combat abuses in low-wage industries.
The need to restructure the limited liability rule as it applies to lowwage workers‟ wages is more compelling than ever. As the Wins case
illustrates, a simpler and more straightforward mechanism is needed to
ensuring that low-wage workers recover the wages they earned. This
article offers an in-depth analysis on the problems faced by wage
creditors and sets forth recommendations for reform that would
guarantee low-wage workers‟ wages, thus exempting them from the
limited liability rule. Part II traces the history of the limited liability

industries—an increase of more than 77% from 2001. WAGE & HOUR DIV., EMPLOYMENT
STANDARDS ADMIN., U.S. DEP‟T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR COLLECTS OVER $1.4 BILLION IN
BACK WAGES FOR OVER 2 MILLION EMPLOYEES SINCE FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 3 (2008), available
at http://www.dol.gov/whd/statistics/2008FiscalYear.pdf. The targeted industries are: agriculture,
day care, restaurants, garment manufacturing, security guard services, health care, hotels and
motels, janitorial services, and temporary help. See id.
39. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 6.
40. See AM. BANKR. INST., QUARTERLY BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY FILINGS FOR 1994-2010
(2010),
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Quarterly_Filings1&TEMPLATE=/CM/
ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=59342. Business bankruptcies are increasing at an alarming
rate, especially among small businesses. See id.; see also Small Business Bankruptcies are Rising,
NPR (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121746133.
41. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2006) („“Employer‟ includes
any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and
includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization (other than when acting as an
employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.”).
42. See id.
43. See Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 1, 16-17 (2010).
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rule. Particular attention is paid to the justifications for the limited
liability rule, the effect of the rule on workers, and the current exceptions
to the rule. Part III discusses the genesis of wage and hour legislation as
well as efforts to exempt wages from the limited liability rule under both
federal and state laws. Part IV presents a comprehensive analysis of the
limitations of the existing frameworks, and Part V recommends a
simpler and more effective mechanism to exempt wages from the limited
liability rule. Specifically, the proposal seeks to guarantee wages for
low-wage workers—creating a system of strict liability for wage
violations.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF LIMITED LIABILITY
A. Development of the Rule
The state has had the exclusive privilege of granting incorporation
status for centuries.44 Scholars disagree on the precise origins of the
limited liability rule, but most agree that the concept did not fully
develop until the late eighteenth century.45 Limited liability was an
extraordinary privilege granted to a select few.46 At first, legislatures
granted the privilege to corporations with public functions.47 The push
to extend limited liability to manufacturing companies gradually
succeeded, first in New Hampshire in 1816, and last in Rhode Island in
1847.48 By the 1840s, limited liability was more widely accepted as a
tenet of corporate law.49
Despite the trend towards limited liability into the twentieth
century, there were significant jurisdictions that imposed some form of

44. See HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES 14 (2d ed. 1970).
45. See id. See generally Blumberg, supra note 35, at 578-81 (discussing the emergence of
the limited liability rule in England).
46. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT,
CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OR PARENT AND
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 13 (1987) (noting that clauses prohibiting assessments beyond the
amount of money invested as capital were becoming common in corporate charters, however these
charters were difficult to acquire). The early corporate charters dealt inconsistently with
shareholder liability. Some charters explicitly provided for direct liability of shareholders, others
for limited liability and the remainder were silent. See id. at 11-12.
47. See E. Merrick Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry:
Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (1948).
48. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 33-34.
49. Mitchell, supra note 5, at 1165-66.
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shareholder liability to protect creditors.50 Until 1830, Massachusetts
expressly held corporate shareholders directly liable to creditors.51
California imposed pro rata shareholder liability until 1931.52 Almost all
states, including New York, imposed double liability between 1810 and
1860 “in an amount equal to the par value of their shares.”53 Double
liability for shareholders of bank stocks was common as late as the
1930s.54 Even after states adopted limited liability, there were numerous
attempts to revive unlimited liability.55
Today, limited liability is the “unqualified and universal” default
rule, either provided for explicitly in corporate statutes or by
implication.56 The rule traditionally shields shareholders and other
equity stakeholders from liability of corporate debts.57 If the corporation
fails, they lose only the value of their investment.58 Officers, employees,
and agents also enjoy limited liability stemming from agency
principles.59 This article will use limited liability to encompass both
shareholder and individual corporate actors.
B. Economic Insights from Empirical Studies
The limited liability rule was developed to encourage and safeguard
investors from the risks undertaken by the entity. The “moral hazard—
the incentive created by limited liability to transfer the cost of risky
activities to creditors”—was justified as a necessary evil for economic
growth.60 Arguably, shifting the risks benefited the public by generating

50. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:3 (2010); Mitchell, supra
note 5, at 1164.
51. See BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 33; Dodd, supra note 47, at 1357 (noting that the
question of implied direct personal liability did not even come before the Massachusetts court until
1809).
52. See BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 44-46.
53. Id. at 46-47; see Dwight Rogers & Donald F. McManus, Stockholders’ Booby-Trap:
Partnership Liabilities of Stockholders Under Section 71, New York Stock Corporation Law, 28
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1151 (1953).
54. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 47-48; Rogers & McManus, supra note 53, at 1157.
55. Blumberg, supra note 35, at 595. Michigan, New Hampshire, Wisconsin and
Pennsylvania repealed limited liability but soon reverted back to it. See id.
56. See Glynn, supra note 30, at 339-40.
57. See id. at 340.
58. See id. (noting that shareholders were not personally liable for corporate debts and were
assured protection from vicarious liability for the obligations of the corporation).
59. See id. at 341.
60. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 50. See generally Richard A. Posner, The
Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 501-02 (1976) (providing an
investment analogy to demonstrate how a moral hazard can at times increase investment by
reducing the borrower‟s risk).
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greater economic activity.61 Equally important, limited liability was
seen as democratic. As Stephen Presser notes, “the imposition of limited
liability was perceived as a means of encouraging the small-scale
entrepreneur, and of keeping entry into business markets competitive
and democratic.”62
While the democratic goal has faded from history, the economic
justification seems to have been uniformly adopted.63 Although there is
not enough empirical data to fully evaluate the economic benefits of
limited liability, several studies have called into question the impact of
limited liability on economic development.64
These studies all
concluded that substantial industrial development took place in
jurisdictions with unlimited liability.65
For several decades in the early 1800s, New England states were a
patchwork of limited and unlimited liability regimes. Massachusetts
imposed unlimited liability until 1830, as did Rhode Island until 1847,
while New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Maine offered limited
liability.66 By comparing states like Massachusetts and Rhode Island
with limited liability states in the early 1800s, the late Harvard
Professor, E. Merrick Dodd, found persuasive evidence that unlimited
liability did not deter economic growth.67 For example, Massachusetts
was the leading cotton-textile state in the country at the time.68 In 1809,
there was a substantial increase in the demand for manufacturing
charters in the state.69 The same year, the Massachusetts legislature
adopted a policy of imposing full unlimited individual liability on
shareholders of manufacturing companies, which it followed for twentyone years.70 The adoption of unlimited liability did not deter
incorporation in Massachusetts, and in 1830—the year the state adopted
limited liability—there was no corresponding increase in

61. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 50; Posner, supra note 60, at 501-02.
62. PRESSER, supra note 50, § 1:3.
63. Id.; see Blumberg, supra note 35, at 577-78. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 5, at 55-56 (analyzing the current economic structure of corporate law including the
economic justifications for limited liability).
64. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 30, at 362-63 (acknowledging that several states, including
Rhode Island and California, flourished during the nineteenth century despite not granting limited
liability).
65. See id.
66. See Dodd, supra note 47, at 1375-76 & n.92.
67. See id. at 1368, 1376.
68. See id. at 1352.
69. Id. at 1363.
70. See id. at 1363-64.
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incorporation.71 However, Dodd concedes that limited liability had a
substantial effect on large-scale businesses, as substantial additional
capital was invested after 1830.72 Similarly, from 1830 to 1847, Rhode
Island was the only New England state to impose unlimited liability.73
Nonetheless, Rhode Island was second to Massachusetts in cotton-textile
manufacturing.74
California provides a more modern example. It was one of the last
significant jurisdictions to continue imposing unlimited liability into the
early twentieth century.75 The California Constitutions of 1849 and
1879 imposed pro rata unlimited shareholder liability for companies
incorporated in California, regardless of where the debt was incurred,
and for foreign corporations doing business in California for debts
arising in California.76 In 1929, the legislature amended the Constitution
to allow for limited liability of any California firm by a simple name
change that included the word “Limited” or “Ltd.”77 In 1930, the pro
rata liability provision was repealed and finally in 1931, a new corporate
code passed the legislature adopting limited liability.78 From 1849 to
1931, the effect of pro rata liability had no adverse impact on
California‟s economy, despite the widespread adoption of limited
liability in most states.79 California was ranked sixth in population in the
forty-eight states and eighth in manufacturing output.80 In a study of
share prices for California corporations traded on the New York Stock
Exchange and other stock exchanges during the time that limited liability
was adopted, Mark Weinstein found no evidence of a change in share
prices.81 Also, there was no significant increase in incorporation after

71. See id. at 1371.
72. See id. at 1373.
73. See id. at 1375-76.
74. See id. at 1376 n.94.
75. See Blumberg, supra note 35, at 597 (describing California as a place where shareholder
liability survived until 1931). See generally Mark I. Weinstein, Limited Liability in California 192831: It’s the Lawyers, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439, 455-60 (2005) (discussing the liability regime in
California).
76. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 42-43; see Mark I. Weinstein, Share Price Changes and the
Arrival of Limited Liability in California, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2003).
77. Weinstein, supra note 76, at 5-6.
78. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 45-46; Weinstein, supra note 76, at 5-6.
79. Weinstein, supra note 76, at 19-20; see also Weinstein, supra note 75, at 455-60. There
were significant procedural hurdles in enforcing pro rata liability, which may have made it a remote
threat to shareholders. See generally Weinstein, supra note 75, at 457 (noting how foreign firms
could only obtain limited liability if their company‟s name included “Ltd.” or “Limited”).
Furthermore, waivers of unlimited liability were valid although it is unclear how often shareholders
required such waivers from creditors. See id. at 446.
80. Weinstein, supra note 75, at 455.
81. See Weinstein, supra note 76, at 7-19.
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the adoption of limited liability in 1929.82
Similarly, Peter Grossman, in his study of the trading of American
Express stock from 1951-1959, debunks the prevalent view that limited
liability is necessary for the functioning of the stock market.83 American
Express Company operated as a pro rata unlimited liability company for
115 years, from 1850 to 1965.84 This liability structure had no impact on
share prices or in trading.85 In fact, American Express stock during this
period traded actively, despite alternatives to invest in stock of
companies with limited liability.86
None of these studies definitively undermine the economic
justification of limited liability. In fact, for every case study like
California or Massachusetts, commentators can point to jurisdictions like
New York that experienced robust economic growth by adopting limited
liability.87 Even Dodd conceded in his historical comparison of New
England states that industrial development “would eventually have been
seriously retarded if our legislatures had failed to encourage investment
by limiting the investor‟s risk.”88 Yet, the rule is not the sine qua non
for economic growth, as these studies indicate.89
C. Not All Creditors Are Equal
Quintessentially, limited liability is risk allocation—shifting to the
creditors and thus the public the costs of risks undertaken by
corporations.90 The rule makes numerous assumptions about creditors.

82. See Weinstein, supra note 75, at 463-66.
83. Peter Z. Grossman, The Market for Shares of Companies with Unlimited Liability: The
Case of American Express, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 85 (1995). The justification that limited liability
was necessary for the functioning of the stock market is further undermined by the relative size of
the stock exchange at the time that states adopted limited liability. It seems unlikely that the state
legislatures considered the stock market a key reason for adopting limited liability. It is equally
possible though that while limited liability was not a necessary mechanism for the market, it may
have played a role (along with other factors such as industrial growth) in the growth of the nascent
market. “In 1867, only 15 industrial shares were traded on the New York Stock Exchange.” JAMES
WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED
STATES 72 (1956). By 1896, the New York Stock Exchange traded 57 million shares and by 1901,
the number was at 266 million shares. Id.
84. See Grossman, supra note 83, at 73-75.
85. See id. at 76-77.
86. See id.
87. See PRESSER, supra note 50, § 1:3.
88. Dodd, supra note 47, at 1378.
89. See id. (stating that the factory system of industrial organization could have thrived under
a legal system that denies limited liability).
90. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL
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It assumes that creditors are more efficient risk assessors. They are
deemed to have superior knowledge and are able to exact a price for
limited liability.91 As Professor Roger Meiners points out, “[w]hen an
individual contracts to limit his liability or has it limited by law, market
conditions force him to pay a price for limited liability.”92 Thus,
creditors can seek personal guarantees or additional security to
compensate for higher risks.93 This paradigm only applies, however, to
the contract creditor—a voluntary creditor that knowingly enters into a
contract with the corporation.94
It is nearly impossible for tort victims and workers to be efficient
risk assessors or have leverage to negotiate a price for limited liability.
Tort victims are unwilling participants and do not have information to
assess a risk that they did not anticipate.95 Tort victims, thus, cannot
bargain with the corporation to either avoid the tort or provide sufficient
compensation to rectify the injury.96
The wage creditor is most often equated with the contract creditor,
as all employment rests on a contractual relationship—the selling and
purchase of labor. Wages are always paid in arrears and thus, the
corporation owes a debt to the worker.97 Structurally, the individual
wage earners are similar to tort victims. They do not have bargaining
rights equal to the employer and have little access to corporate
information.98 To imagine that Fei Yi Chen, the monolingual Chinese
Wins garment worker, could have, at the time of hire, asked for and
received information about the Wins‟ finances, been able to understand

L. REV. 1036, 1047 (1991).
91. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 51; Posner, supra note 60, at 501-02.
92. Roger E. Meiners et al., Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 361
(1979).
93. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 501 (2001); see
also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 51-52 (explaining that if debtor firms cannot make
credible promises to refrain from excessive risks, it must pay higher interest rates).
94. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 51-52. This market efficiency theory has been
severely criticized for its inherent flaws. Creditors are not necessarily risk averse. See id. (noting
that the presumption that creditors are more risk averse is implausible; superior information can
explain some, but not all, of limited liability).
95. See Kahan, supra note 33, at 1102 (“[M]any tort victims cannot forsee their injuries.”);
Thompson, supra note 90, at 1071 (“[F]ew tort victims would choose the risks involuntarily thrust
upon them by a corporation unable to pay for harm caused by its operation.”).
96. Kahan, supra note 33, at 1102.
97. Eric Tucker, Shareholder and Director Liability for Unpaid Workers’ Wages in Canada:
From Conditions of Granting Limited Liability to Exceptional Remedy, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 57,
58 (2008).
98. See generally Blumberg, supra note 35, at 616-19 (noting that the dispositive inquiry for
an injured party in a credit transaction is whether that party had the economic strength to bargain on
the issue).
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and assess the probability of corporate failure, and then negotiated either
a higher wage or a personal guarantee based on the risk is incongruous
with reality. Corporations, thus, pay no extra price for the privilege of
limited liability for wage debts. Unfortunately, unlike the tort creditor,
the inequality of the situation for wage creditors has not been addressed
by the academy.
D. Current Exceptions to Limited Liability
Absent contracting specifically for unlimited liability (usually by
securing personal guarantees), there are two main mechanisms for
contravening the limited liability regime: piercing the corporate veil
doctrine and statutory exceptions to the default rule.
Since the nineteenth century, courts have been willing to disregard
the corporate form and pierce the veil to reach shareholders in an attempt
to balance the benefits and costs of limited liability.99 In essence, courts
have looked to a multitude of factors to assess when to disregard the
corporate “veil” and hold individuals personally liable for corporate
transgressions.100 There is no uniform application of the veil piercing
doctrine from state to state.101 Thus, it has been described as “among the
most confusing in corporate law” and a “legal quagmire.”102
Robert Thompson‟s empirical analysis of all veil piercing cases,
while dated, is useful in shedding light on when courts have used the
doctrine to hold corporate individuals personally liable. Of the cases
where the courts did pierce the veil, none involved a publicly held
corporation.103 Courts were more likely to pierce the veil if the
corporation had only three or fewer shareholders.104 The role of the
99. See David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits
of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1311 (2007). There is a massive body of law and
commentary on the veil piercing doctrine. See, e.g., PRESSER, supra note 50; Bainbridge, supra note
93; Blumberg, supra note 35.
100. See Millon, supra note 99, at 1330-39 (explaining that while the factors vary according to
state law, courts are more likely to pierce the corporate structure when one or more of these factors
are present: (1) fraud or misrepresentation; (2) using the corporation as an instrumentality, agent or
“alter ego” for the activities of the dominant shareholders; (3) non-observance of corporate
formalities; and (4) undercapitalization).
101. See PRESSER, supra note 50, § 1:1 (“[T]here has been a real reluctance on the part of
courts to clearly define piercing the veil standards.”).
102. Id.
103. Thompson, supra note 90, at 1047.
104. See id. at 1054-55. John Matheson & Raymond Eby argue that close corporations are
more likely to not adhere to corporate formalities which make them likely targets for piercing. See
John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of Multiple
Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving Owners’ Limited-Liability
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shareholder factored into the courts‟ analysis to pierce the veil.105 If the
shareholder served as a director or officer or was otherwise active in the
business, courts were more likely to pierce.106 In the few cases that
described the shareholder as passive, courts almost always found no
liability.107 Courts pierced the corporate veil significantly more in cases
involving contract creditors rather than tort creditors.108
Some legal commentators have concluded that the veil piercing
doctrine is not an adequate vehicle to rectify the costs of limited
liability.109 The multi-factored test varies from state to state and gives
courts wide latitude in applying the factors.110 Veil piercing undermines
the very predictability and certainty guaranteed by limited liability, as it
is difficult to ascertain when courts will pierce the corporate veil.111
In the Wins case, the workers produced evidence that Wong and
Quan commingled assets, interchanging personal and corporate funds
without any formality or approval process.112 In addition, Wong and
Quan operated their corporations without adherence to any corporate
formalities.113 Despite this evidence and supporting case law, the trial
court did not find alter ego liability.114 As Stephen Bainbridge observed,
the veil piercing doctrine “allows judges to impose their own brand of
rough justice without being overly concerned with precedent or appellate
review.”115
While debate continues as to the effectiveness of the veil piercing
doctrine, in the last several decades, Congress adopted explicit statutory
Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147, 175-76 (2000).
105. See Thompson, supra note 90, at 1056.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1058. While Thompson explains that some of the statistical differences are
attributed to the court‟s willingness to pierce in misrepresentation cases, he concludes that even
when removing these cases, courts pierced the veil more often in contract than tort cases. Id. at
1069.
109. See Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 514-15; Glynn, supra note 30, at 351.
110. See Harvey Gelb, Limited Liability Policy and Veil Piercing, 9 WYO. L. REV. 551, 555-58
(2009) (explaining the limited liability judicial approach).
111. See id. at 558; Glynn, supra note 30, at 349.
112. Tentative Statement of Decision, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 523-24.
113. Id. at 525.
114. Bradstreet v. Wong, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253, 267 (Ct. App. 2008). On similar facts, the
California Supreme Court pierced the corporate veil of a family corporation where mother and son
had entered into a large number of personal transactions with the corporations. Riddle v.
Leuschner, 335 P.2d 107, 109 (Cal. 1959). The pair borrowed money from or lent money to the
corporations without any formal approval by the corporations‟ directors or stockholders. Id. The
assets of the two corporations were intermingled to suit the needs of the family. See id. The court
found that the family pierced the corporate veil because they dominated and controlled the
corporations, and that there was no separation between them and the corporations. Id. at 110-12.
115. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 515.
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mechanisms to override the limited liability rule.116 One key area that
the federal government and some states have carved out of the limited
liability rule is workers‟ wages. The policy justification for exempting
wages from limited liability stems from the special nature of the wage
debt. However, wages were not always protected under the law.
III. WAGES: TOWARDS MINIMUM STANDARDS
AND SPECIAL PROTECTION
Thou shalt not oppress an hired servant that is poor and needy . . . . At
his day thou shalt give him his hire . . . lest he cry against thee unto the
117
LORD: and it be sin unto thee.

Since antiquity, wages have been considered special debts because
of the unique nature of the labor contract.118 Workers provide a value to
their employer in exchange for wages, which they depend on for their
survival.119 Labor conditions have changed very little for workers at the
bottom—they perform the same repetitive tasks for wages that barely
meet their minimum needs.120 Without legislative intervention, lowwage workers suffered exploitative conditions and substandard wages
due to the employers‟ superior bargaining power, causing detriment not
only to their welfare but also to the public.121
By the end of the nineteenth century, rapid industrialization, the
influx of new immigrants, and the shift to factory production further

116. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006) (imposing joint liability
on every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under the act); Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (2006) (making any person required to comply with the
collection and payment of payroll taxes personally liable for violations); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2006)
(imposing strict liability on owners or operators of any facility involved in the violation).
117. Deuteronomy 24:14-15 (King James).
118. See Tucker, supra note 97, at 58 (explaining that wages are special because they are paid
in arrears, and are normally used to support the workers and their dependents).
119. See id.
120. See DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE
STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925, at 58 (1987) (“[T]he men who wielded
shovels and pushed wheelbarrows on twentieth-century construction projects bore an uncanny
resemblance to those who had dug canals and erected fortifications two hundred years earlier. . . .
They exchanged simple physical force for a daily wage, whose level changed only gradually over
the course of the nineteenth century.”); Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 20 (2000).
121. See Harris, supra note 120, at 20.
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exacerbated working conditions for low-wage workers. 122 A national
movement emerged advocating for national and state legislation limiting
hours of work and setting a living wage.123
A. Genesis of Wage and Hour Legislation
One tool at the disposal of the states was the police power. The
judiciary had long recognized the inherent power of the states to regulate
in the interest of the public‟s safety, health, morals, and general
welfare.124 Prior to 1870, the states sparingly utilized their police
powers to pass social legislation.125 In the 1880s, however, states began
to broadly exercise its power, especially in the arena of employment.126
As mining and manufacturing industries developed, every state passed
legislation regulating the health and safety of the workplace in some
manner. For instance, lawmakers regulated fire escapes in large
buildings including factories, protected workers from accidental contact
with dangerous machinery, and ensured the cleanliness and ventilation
of working rooms.127 States also began to affirmatively set maximum
hours and minimum wages, first for women and children, and eventually
for all workers in all industries.128
122. See HURST, supra note 83, at 71-72. The non-agricultural labor force more than doubled
in a century from 28% in 1820 to 62% by 1900. Id. at 71.
123. See Michael J. Goldberg, Law, Labor, and the Mainstream Press: Labor Day
Commentaries on Labor and Employment Law, 15 LAB. LAW. 93, 122 (1999); see also
MONTGOMERY, supra note 120, at 195-96 (noting popular enthusiasm for the eight-hour workday);
Harris, supra note 120, at 46-48 (discussing the American minimum wage campaign). Even the
Catholic Church weighed in on the side of worker protective legislation. See Harris, supra note
120, at 39. In 1891, Pope Leo XIII issued the Rerum Novarum, an influential Catholic doctrine on
the working classes acknowledging the place for government regulation over working conditions.
Id. at 39 n.99. John Ryan, a priest influenced by the Rerum Novarum‟s call for reform, joined the
living wage movement and agitated for government protection. See id. at 40. In a 1900 article in the
Catholic World, Ryan stated that “[t]here can be no freedom of contract between laborers who must
work today or starve and a capitalist who may pay the wages demanded or wait until hunger
compels the men to submit.” Id. at 41.
124. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 387-88 (1898).
125. See HURST, supra note 83, at 76, 97. See generally Holden, 169 U.S. at 392-93
(describing the lack of regulation on the coal mining and iron manufacturing industries since 1716
because of the primitive methods and limited nature of these industries).
126. See HURST, supra note 83, at 97. See generally Holden, 169 U.S. at 387 (noting that
states have exercised the power to change their own laws with increasing frequency and that the
laws will no doubt be affected by how society views the relationship between an employer and
employee).
127. See Holden, 169 U.S. at 393-94.
128. See William P. Quigley, “A Fair Day’s Pay for a Fair Day’s Work”: Time to Raise and
Index the Minimum Wage, 27 ST. MARY‟S L.J. 513, 516 (1996) (noting that Massachusetts passed
the first minimum wage law for women and children in 1912); see also Harris, supra note 120, at
59-60 (noting that in 1908, Massachusetts passed the first law imposing a fifty-six hour workweek).
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The Supreme Court closely scrutinized worker-protective
legislation through the narrow prism of individual contract rights.129
Contracts for employment were squarely within the liberty interest and
the Supreme Court derided state interference.130 The Constitution
protected the “right to purchase or to sell labor.”131 Central to this belief
was the judiciary‟s assumption that the worker was on equal footing
with the employer in negotiating the contract:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems
proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor
to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from
the person offering to sell it. . . . In all such particulars the employer
and the employé have equality of right, and any legislation that
disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of
132
contract which no government can legally justify in a free land.

The seminal case, Lochner v. New York,133 overturned a New York
law setting maximum hours for bakers.134 The majority placed a heavy
burden on states to justify the exercise of its police power as
reasonable.135 Much has been written about the Lochner era, a period
roughly from the 1890s to 1940 where the Supreme Court frequently
struck down wage and hour regulations.136 In 1923, the Supreme Court
invalidated the District of Columbia‟s minimum wage law for women in

After the 1912 passage of a minimum wage, eight other states enacted similar legislation the same
year. Id.
129. See generally Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915) (exonerating employers who
violated a state statute designed to protect workers‟ right to unionize under the view that the state
could not impede the liberty of contract between employers and employees.); Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) (reinforcing the right of a worker to sell his labor upon his own
terms).
130. See, e.g., Coppage, 236 U.S. at 14; Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-75.
131. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
132. Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-75. One commentator at the time retorted, “[w]hy do so many
[judges] force upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the face of practical conditions of
inequality . . . ? Why is the legal conception of the relation of employer and employee so at
variance with the common knowledge of mankind?” Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE
L.J. 454, 454 (1908).
133. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
134. Id. at 64-65.
135. See id. at 61.
136. Outside of the employment context, Lochner has been severely criticized through the lens
of constitutional due process jurisprudence. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW passim (1978) (seminal critique that coined the term “Lochner era” to
describe Lochner and its progeny); David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial
Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005) (discussing the “Lochner era”).
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Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.137 Following Adkins, the Supreme Court
struck down several state minimum wage laws for women as
“repugnant” to due process and struck down Congressional attempt to
regulate wages and hours.138
Frustrated by the restrictive view of the Supreme Court towards
minimum labor standards legislation, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
unveiled his “court-packing” plan on February 5, 1937.139 A few weeks
after the “court-packing” plan was announced, the Supreme Court
decided West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.140 In Parrish, the Supreme Court
overruled Adkins and upheld a Washington state law setting a minimum
wage for women and minors.141 Parrish, once and for all, ended the
debate over whether the legislature had the power to fix minimum wages
or impose overtime premiums for excessive hours.142 The next battle
was over who was covered under these laws.
B. The Evolution of Individual Corporate Liability
for Wage Violations
Congress and some states went further than just safeguarding wages
and creating minimum standards. They recognized that the traditional
master-servant relationship left too many workers without protection and
no remedy when corporations failed. Thus, reshaping the employeremployee relationship became central to some wage and hour legislation
including FLSA.143
Under the common-law, the employment
relationship was characterized as between the master and servant,
wherein “the employer retains the right to direct the manner in which the
business shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or, in
other words, “not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done.”144
137. See Adkins v. Children‟s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923). The majority spends a
great deal of time reviewing the breadth of cases dealing with state interference with contractual
rights and concludes that there can be no justification for laws establishing minimum wages. See id.
at 546-53, 562.
138. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (striking down
New York‟s minimum wage law for women); Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657
(1927) (striking down Arkansas‟ minimum wage law for women); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530
(1925) (striking down Arizona‟s minimum wage law for women).
139. Harris, supra note 120, at 113.
140. Id. at 114.
141. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
142. See id.
143. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)-(e) (2006) (defining employer
and employee).
144. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518, 523 (1889) (quoting R.R. Co. v. Hanning, 82 U.S.
649, 657 (1872)).
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Too many workers fell outside the scope of the common-law test
because of its singular focus on control over the work performed by the
individual.145 The term employer was also narrowly construed to the
entity that hired and contracted with the worker.146 For corporate
entities, the limited liability rule protected individual corporate actors
from personal liability.147
There were two strains in the evolution of individual corporate
liability for unpaid wages of workers—strict liability and control-based
liability.148 In the late 1800s, legislatures experimented with creating
shareholder wage guarantees.149 While very few of those laws survive
today, California recently enacted a wage guarantee system in the
garment industry.150 On the other end of the spectrum are the FLSA and
some state wage and hour definitions of employer that hold corporate
individuals, who exercise control over the entity or labor relations,
personally liable for violations.151
1. Shareholder Surety Laws
In the 1800s, vigorous debates about the usefulness of the corporate
form and the limited liability rule ensued.152 Many state legislators were
in favor of direct shareholder liability to protect creditors, but populists
viewed the limited liability rule as a “mode of swindling” and “a fraud
on the honest and confiding part of the public.”153 Central to the debate
145. See Goldstein et al., supra note 1, at 1028-29.
146. See, e.g., State Div. of Human Rights v. GTE Corp., 487 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235 (App. Div.
1985) (holding that defendant was still the employer because it hired the complainant despite
payment from a third party).
147. See Mendelson, supra note 34, at 1211.
148. See id. at 1206-07 (discussing control-based liability); see also LORA JO FOO, ASIAN
AMERICAN WOMEN: ISSUES, CONCERNS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCACY 70 (2003) (discussing
attempts by garment workers to obtain a manufacturer‟s strict liability law).
149. See, e.g., S. HERBERT UNTERBERGER, GUARANTEED WAGE & SUPPLEMENTARY
UNEMPLOYMENT PAY PLANS 15 (1956).
150. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2673.1 (West 2003).
151. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2006).
152. Anti-corporate sentiment had two strains in the early discourse. One group expressed
wholesale opposition to the corporate form as a usurpation of public power, anti-democratic and a
threat to the republic. See WILLIAM ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL 46, 52-53 (1997). Others rallied
against the preferential treatment given to a few by state charter. See id. at 52-53. This group
sought to pass general incorporation law as a way to “democratize entrepreneurial opportunities” by
expanding the availability of the corporate form. Note, Incorporating the Republic: The
Corporation in Antebellum Political Culture, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1887 (1989).
153. Matheson & Eby, supra note 104, at 154-55 (quoting THOMAS COOPER, LECTURES ON
THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 247, 250 (2d ed. 1830)); see also Mitchell, supra note 5, at
1165.

28

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:9

was the issue of retaining unlimited liability for workers‟ wages. New
York considered the policy reason for why shareholders should be liable
for wage debts.
What class shall be thus favored, in whole or in part . . . ? Shall it be
the farmer, the merchant, the blacksmith, the day laborer, the lawyer,
the doctor, the carpenter, the mechanic of any kind? No, not any one
man, nor men in common, but the capitalists, and those of all others
154
best able to pay their debts.

In 1848, New York adopted a very broad shareholder wage lien
law: “The stockholders of any company organized under the provisions
of this act, shall be jointly and severally individually liable for all debts
that may be due and owing to all their laborers, servants and apprentices,
for services performed for such corporation.”155 Other states followed
suit with similar language. These laws varied, but in essence, they
imposed strict liability on shareholders for unpaid wages incurred for a
limited period of time.156
Some laws imposing liability on shareholders for unpaid wages
survived into the twentieth century.157 Tennessee, until 1969, held
shareholders of manufacturing and mining corporations personally liable
for unpaid wages of laborers and other employees.158 Pennsylvania had
pro rata stockholder liability for employees‟ salaries and wages until
1966.159 Michigan abandoned the constitutional provision for wage
liability for shareholders in 1963 and repealed the statutory basis for
shareholder wage liability in 1973.160 Wisconsin adopted shareholder
liability for wages in 1849, and it survived until 2005 when the
Wisconsin legislature repealed it in favor of general limited liability.161

154. Tucker, supra note 97, at 66 (quoting REPORT ON SO MUCH OF THE CONSTITUTION AS
RELATES TO MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, S. 70-53, 17th Sess., at 3 (N.Y. 1847)).
155. Comment, Shareholder Liability for Wages: Section 630 of the New York Business
Corporation Law, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 471, 472 n.5 (1962) [hereinafter
Shareholder Liability] (quoting 1848 N.Y. Sess. Laws § 18).
156. See generally Annotation, Who is an Employee, Laborer, or Servant, etc., of Corporation
Within Statute Relating to Liability of Stockholders to that Class of Persons, 104 A.L.R. 765 (1936)
[hereinafter Who is an Employee] (discussing stockholder liability for debts due to those employed
by the company).
157. See BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 50; see also Shareholder Liability, supra note 155, at
472.
158. See Hand v. Cale, 12 S.W. 922, 922 (Tenn. 1890); BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 50 n.33.
159. See BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 50 n.33.
160. See MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 4 (1908); BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 50 n.33.
161. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0622(2) (West 2002); Assemb. 1163, 2005-2006 Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2006); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Shareholder Liability for Claims by Employees, 1984
WIS. L. REV. 741, 741 (1984).
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New York and Massachusetts are the only two states where laws on
shareholder liability for wage claims survive in some limited fashion.162
Most of the litigation surrounding the surety laws centered on the
scope of coverage.163 Many courts viewed the surety laws as applying to
a narrow scope of employees, those at the bottom-end who needed
special protection.164 Most states abandoned the shareholder surety laws
in favor of limited liability.
2. Broad Employer Coverage under the FLSA
The FLSA has one of most expansive definitions of employeremployee, neither restrained by common-law concepts nor restricted by
contract.165 Under the FLSA, multiple simultaneous employers may be
responsible for compliance.166 The FLSA defines an employer in a
circular way as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of
an employer in relation to an employee.”167 An employee is defined as
“any individual employed by an employer.”168 Crucially, borrowing
directly from the child labor statutes, the FLSA defines employ to
include “suffer or permit to work.”169
Under each of the FLSA definitions, courts have applied the
“economic reality” test, utilizing several varying factors to determine

162. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 630(a) (McKinney 2003) (imposing liability on the ten
largest shareholders of non-publicly traded corporations for unpaid wages); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
156, § 35 (2005) (imposing liability on shareholders for services rendered up to six months prior to
the demand for payment).
163. See, e.g., Who is an Employee, supra note 156, at 766-73 (discussing several cases in
which the court considered what class of persons the legislation was designed to protect).
164. See id.; Tucker, supra note 97, at 80-81.
165. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1947); see also Rutherford
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947).
166. See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2009); Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th
Cir. 1991); Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1983).
167. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2006). “Person,” in turn, is
defined as “an individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative,
or any organized group of persons.” Id. § 203(a).
168. Id. § 203(e)(1).
169. Id. § 203(g). Child labor statutes were the first labor legislation to define employ to
include “to suffer or permit.” See Goldstein et al., supra note 1, at 1015. Historically, the “suffer or
permit” standard had been widely used by legislators under penal statutes to impose an expansive
affirmative obligation to prevent unlawful acts. Id. For example, an early eighteenth century law in
Pennsylvania imposed liability on an owner who allowed his livestock to damage another‟s
property. See id. at 1015-16. In 1814, Connecticut forbade transportation owners or drivers to
“suffer or allow” travel on the Sabbath. Id. at 1024. It was also used to impose criminal sanctions
on persons who allowed unlawful conduct such as the illicit sale of liquor. See id. at 1025.
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coverage.170 With respect to liability for corporate individuals, courts
seldom apply the “economic reality” test, focusing instead on the acts of
the individual.171 The presence of one of these crucial factors will result
in liability for corporate individuals: (1) operational control, (2)
substantial role in setting personnel policies and/or control over the
employees, and/or (3) knowing participation in the violation.172 While
there is no consistent approach to trigger corporate individual liability
under FLSA, the overwhelming majority of circuit courts impose
personal liability where operational control over the day-to-day
management and/or vis-à-vis the employees exists.173
a. Operational Control
The seminal case, Donovan v. Agnew174 in the First Circuit,
involved all three factors.175 In Agnew, two shareholders held all
corporate offices and ran the day-to-day management of the company.176
They had substantial control over personnel matters, including hiring,
firing, and payroll.177 They paid other obligations and/or retained profits

170. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2003) (identifying a fourfactor, five-factor, and seven-factor test, all active in the Second Circuit and applicable under
different circumstances). Interestingly, the “economic reality” test was developed under the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which did not explicitly define the employer-employee
relationship. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ‟ns, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944). In the absence of clear
statutory language under the NLRA and the expansive scope of that statute, the Supreme Court in
Hearst Publications rejected the narrow common-law test and adopted a test that looked at
“underlying economic facts,” such as the degree of control, opportunities for profit or loss,
investment in facilities, permanency of relations, and skill required. See id. at 129-32. Although
Congress eventually disavowed the “economic reality” test under the NLRA as well as under the
Social Security Act, virtually all FLSA decisions regarding coverage under the Act continue to
utilize the test. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324-25 (1992).
171. See, e.g., Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding an
individual with no ownership interest who exercised significant control over employees liable);
Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 637-38 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding a president, director, and principal
stockholder who was not involved in day-to-day operation or supervision of employees not to be
liable); Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that a
nominal president had no stock ownership but met operational control test to be liable); Schultz v.
Chalk-Fitzgerald Constr. Co., 309 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1970) (“It makes no
difference whether such person is a stockholder or officer of the corporate employer. Indeed, it
makes no difference whether the employer is a corporation or a natural person.”); Wirtz v. Pure Ice
Co., 322 F.2d 259, 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1963) (finding that a 75% shareholder who lived in another
city and had no knowledge of the corporate operations not to be liable).
172. See Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1514 (1st Cir. 1983).
173. See Sabine, 695 F.2d at 194-95.
174. 712 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1983).
175. See id. at 1514.
176. See id. at 1511.
177. See id.
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before properly compensating their employees.178 The First Circuit
concluded, “[t]he overwhelming weight of authority is that a corporate
officer with operational control of a corporation‟s covered enterprise is
an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severally liable
under the FLSA for unpaid wages.”179
In Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc.,180 the president and chief
corporate officer was deemed an employer for having significant control
over the day-to-day functions of the corporation, including controlling
the purse strings.181 In another case, the owners, operators, and sole
shareholders who exercised operational control over the company were
liable even though they had no direct control over the workers or
personnel policies.182
b. Control Over Employees/Labor Relations
Some courts focus exclusively on control over the employee.183
Relevant factors include whether the individual “(1) had the power to
hire and fire employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work
schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and
method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.”184
Whether supervisory employees can be liable has not been addressed
consistently by the circuit courts.185 The First Circuit, in an oft-cited
passage, rejected liability of mere supervisors.

178. See id.
179. Id.
180. 942 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1991).
181. See id. at 966.
182. See Ansoumana v. Gristede‟s Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). Indirect control may also be sufficient. See Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190,
194-95 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding nominal president of the company liable because he effectively
dominated the company and indirectly controlled payroll, insurance, and income tax matters).
183. See, e.g., U.S. Dep‟t of Labor v. Cole Enters., Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1995).
184. Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Cole, 62 F.3d
at 778 (noting that chief executive officer with significant ownership interest who issued checks,
maintained and controlled employment records, determined salaries and made hiring decision
qualified as an employer under the FLSA). Nonetheless, the employee control test has been
criticized as too narrowly appropriating the common-law agency test. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel
Co., 355 F.3d 61, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2003).
185. Compare Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1513 (1st Cir. 1983) (requiring operational
control to be liable as an employer), with Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2001)
(finding suit against a supervisory employee viable), and Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d
324, 329 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding a supervisory employee without ownership interest to be an
employer).
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[We do not] think too much weight can be put on the Act‟s broadly
inclusive definition of “employer.” Taken literally and applied in this
context it would make any supervisory employee, even those without
any control over the corporation‟s payroll, personally liable for the
186
unpaid or deficient wages of other employees.

In other circuits, supervisory employees without ownership
interests were liable for FLSA violations.187 In Reich v. Circle C.
Investments, Inc.,188 the individual defendant had a consulting agreement
with the plaintiff‟s company, which excluded personnel matters from his
responsibilities.189 He did not have any ownership interest and did not
control the day-to-day operations.190 The Fifth Circuit, nevertheless,
found him to be an employer, because he hired some of the workers,
supervised workers and gave specific instructions to some, signed
worker‟s payroll checks, and issued memos to workers about policies
and procedures.191
The FLSA definition of employer has not been adopted wholesale
by states. State wage and hour laws provide an additional layer of
protection, and in some instances, provide greater protection than the
FLSA.192 The lack of uniform treatment of corporate individuals among
states leaves many workers without a mechanism to recover their wages.

186. Agnew, 712 F.2d, at 1513. Rather, supervisory employees must have an ownership
interest to be deemed an employer. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1012 (9th Cir. 1999).
187. See, e.g., Luder, 253 F.3d at 1022 (finding a suit against a prison official who supervised
employees to be viable under the FLSA).
188. 998 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1993).
189. See id. at 329.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. One in four states provide for a higher minimum wage than the federal minimum wage.
See
Minimum
Wage
Laws
in
the
States,
U.S.
DEP‟T
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm (last updated July 2010). The federal minimum
wage increased to $7.25 on July 24, 2009.
See Wages, U.S. DEP‟T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/index.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2010). While the FLSA credits
tips towards the minimum wage, some states guarantee the minimum wage regardless of tips. See
Minimum
Wages
for
Tipped
Employees,
U.S.
DEP‟T
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/tipped.htm (last updated July 2010). A few states, such as California,
Alaska, and Nevada, provide for daily overtime, while FLSA provides for overtime after forty hours
of work. See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, supra. Most states also afford additional
safeguards that are not part of the FLSA. These safeguards include immediate payment of wages
upon separation of employment, payment of accrued vacation, payment of semimonthly pay
periods, and treatment of fringe benefit contributions as wages. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 115/3, /5, /8 (West 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.020, .030, .060 (West 2008).
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3. Piecemeal Individual Corporate Liability Among States
As varied as corporate law is from state to state, the same is true for
state wage and hour laws. Under most wage and hour laws, there are
two sections governing unpaid wages: wage payment and collection and
minimum wage. The wage payment and collection section focuses on
prompt payment of wages, payment of wages upon termination, and
private right of action for unpaid wages. The minimum wage section
guarantees a minimum wage and, in most states, has its own
enforcement mechanism.193
Before the passage of the FLSA, few states embraced the scope of
the “suffer or permit” language outside of child labor statutes.194
Following FLSA, two-thirds of the states adopted the FLSA definitions
for “employ” and “employer” under their minimum wage laws.195
However, more than three-quarters of the states did not extend the
expansive definitions to the general wage collections section.196
In extending liability to corporate officers and agents, states
generally define employer in one of three ways under the general wage
193. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/4, /7, /12 (2008). Some states include overtime
premium pay under the minimum wage section. See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, supra note
192.
194. See Goldstein et al., supra note 1, at 1016. In the early 1900s, the California and Texas
wage boards—charged with investigating work conditions in various occupations and industries as
well as setting minimum standards—used the “suffer or permit” language. See id. at 1076.
195. Under the minimum wage laws, thirty states define employ to include “to suffer or
permit” or “permit” and define employer to include “any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer.” An additional three states define an employee as an individual “suffered
or permitted” to work. Two states, Alaska and Florida, explicitly incorporate the FLSA definitions
for minimum wage violations. (A state comparison chart created by the author is on file.)
196. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-58(e) (2003) (The minimum wage statute defines
employer as “any owner or any person, partnership, corporation, limited liability company or
association of persons acting directly as, or in behalf of, or in the interest of an employer in relation
to employees.), with § 31-71a(1) (The payment of wages statute defines employer as “any
individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, corporation, . . . or assignee of any
of the same, employing any person.”); compare D.C. CODE § 32-1002(3) (2010) (The minimum
wages statute defines employer as “any individual, partnership, association, corporation, business
trust, or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee.”), with § 32-1301(1) (The payment and collection of wages statute defines
employer as “every individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, . . . or the receiver,
trustee, or successor of an individual, firm, partnership, association, or corporation, employing any
person in the District of Columbia.”); compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-201(a)(iii) (2009) (The
minimum wage statute defines employer as “any individual, partnership, association, corporation,
business trust, or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee.”), with § 27-4-501(a)(i) (The wage collection statute defines
employer as “any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, corporation, labor
organization, . . . or the receiver, trustee, or successor of any of the same, employing any person.”).
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collections act: (1) by enumerating officers and agents in the definition
of employer;197 (2) by requiring scienter of officers and agents who are
responsible for management of the corporation;198 or (3) broadly by
including any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of the
employer.199
The rationale for extending liability to officers and agents is
captured aptly by the Pennsylvania State Appellate Court‟s interpretation
of the definition of employer. Under its general wage payment act,
Pennsylvania explicitly enumerates agents and officers in the definition
of employer.200 The Court stated:
Thus, we see no logic in imposing the brunt of this financial fiasco on
those so attenuated from the core of the fault as to be absolved from
any wrongdoing, . . . and place the obligation on the shoulders of those
who make the decisions as to the manner in which the Corporation is
201
managed.

197. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-1(A) (West 2009) (“„[E]mployer‟ includes every
person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, . . . and any agent or officer of any of the above
mentioned classes, employing any person in this state.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-101(5)
(West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-9-1(a) (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148
(2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(a) (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-14-01 (2004); 43 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 260.2a (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-14-1(3) (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. §
41-10-10(1) (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-11-8 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-28-2(3)
(LexisNexis 2005); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(a) (2009).
198. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1101(b) (2009) (“[T]he officers of a corporation and
any agents having the management thereof who knowingly permit the corporation to violate this
chapter shall be deemed to be the employers of the employees of the corporation.”); see also KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-323(b) (2009) (including major shareholders); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/2
(West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:42(I) (2010); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(m).
199. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.010(1)(d) (LexisNexis 2007) (“„Employer‟ is any
person, either individual, corporation, partnership, agency, or firm who employs an employee and
includes any person, either individual, corporation, partnership, agency, or firm acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”); see also ALASKA STAT. §
23.10.145 (2009) (following the FLSA definition); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/2; MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 408.471(d) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 177.23(6) (West 2009); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-3-201(5) (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.2(5) (2010); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §
61.001(4) (West 2006).
200. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 260.2a.
201. Laborers Combined Funds of W. Pa. v. Mattei, 518 A.2d 1296, 1300 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986). In Mattei, the corporation filed for bankruptcy after its bookkeeper embezzled a significant
amount of money. Id. at 1297. The corporate officers and 100% shareholders argued that since the
fault lay with the bookkeeper, they should not be held personally liable for unpaid fringe benefits to
union trust funds. Id. at 1298. Fringe benefits are considered wages under the wage payment act.
43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 260.2a.
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4. Guaranteeing Wages: California‟s AB 633
California has long held the distinction of being the garment
sweatshop capital of the nation.202 Labor advocates recognized that the
existing legal frameworks did little to penetrate the industry‟s
subcontracting structure, which ensured noncompliance with wage and
hour laws.203 In 1999, after years of advocacy and targeted litigation, the
California legislature passed AB 633, a historical bill negotiated by labor
advocates and the retail and apparel industries.204 Of significance, the
bill added section 2673.1 to the California Labor Code, which created a
“wage guarantee.”205 Accordingly, garment manufacturers would be
strictly and jointly liable for the proportionate share of the unpaid wages
of their contractors‟ employees.206 In essence, the manufacturers
became the “guarantors” for the garment workers‟ wages.207 Liability is
simply premised on whether the manufacturer did business with the
contractor during the time of the wage violations.208
The guarantee can only be enforced through an administrative
complaint process with the Labor Commissioner.209 The original
language in AB 633 allowed for a private right of action to enforce the
wage guarantee.210 The retail and apparel industries strongly resisted the
inclusion of private enforcement.211 Labor advocates struggled over the
political roadblock.212 After a decade of resistance, the manufacturers
202. See GARMENT WORKERS COLLABORATIVE, REINFORCING THE SEAMS: GUARANTEEING
LAW 9 (Rina Chakraborty et al. eds.,
2005).
203. See Lora Jo Foo, Negotiating AB 633, The Garment Accountability Bill, 13 CAL. LAB. &
EMP. L.Q., Winter 1999, at 5.
204. See id.; see also Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In: Legal Mobilization in the Los Angeles
Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 45-46 (2009). In the late 1970s,
garment advocates pushed for broader joint liability for all manufacturers regardless of whether they
used unlicensed contractors. See id. at 44. Instead, the California legislature passed a bill that
required all garment manufacturers and contractors to register with the state and pass an exam to
obtain a license. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2675(a) (West 2003). In addition, the legislature imposed joint
liability on any person engaged in garment manufacturing who contracted with an unregistered
contractor for the unregistered contractor‟s wage violations. Id. § 2677(a). However, the law did
very little to curb abuses because of the relative ease of registering and obtaining a license. See
Cummings, supra, at 44.
205. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2673.1(a).
206. See id. § 2673.1(b).
207. See GARMENT WORKERS COLLABORATIVE, supra note 202, at 6.
208. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2673.1(b).
209. See id. § 2673.1(c).
210. Foo, supra note 203, at 5.
211. See id.
212. See id.
THE PROMISE OF CALIFORNIA‟S LANDMARK ANTI-SWEATSHOP
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were agreeing to joint liability for unpaid wages.213 Yet, advocates knew
the limitations of government enforcement and believed that private
actions could bring reform to the industry more swiftly. 214 Nonetheless,
advocates agreed to take out the private enforcement language in
exchange for additional provisions.215
After the passage of AB 633, there was a sharp rise in the number
of garment wage claims filed.216 From 1995 to 1998, approximately 565
wage claims were filed by garment workers in California.217 From 2001
to 2004, the number rose to 2,282.218 Six years after AB 633 passed, a
report issued by the California Garment Workers Collaborative found
that “[g]uarantors paid almost 30% of the total amount of money paid to
workers.”219 Yet, ineffective enforcement by the Labor Commissioner
of AB 633 remains the biggest hurdle. The Garment Workers
Collaborative report found that the agency failed to conduct adequate
investigations of guarantors and failed to identify them in almost half of
the cases.220
In the Wins case, despite the fact that the workers had filed
individual claims under AB 633, the Labor Commissioner chose to
bypass the administrative process.221 Instead, the Labor Commissioner
filed suit against the owners under the more general regulatory definition
of employer.222 Potential guarantors like Bebe, JCPenney, and Sears
would have faced joint liability in the administrative process.223 The
Labor Commissioner‟s decision to not pursue this avenue, in the end,
undermined the recovery for the Wins workers.
AB 633, much like the shareholder surety laws, provided for strict
liability for unpaid wages. But, it went a step further than the
shareholder surety laws by holding an entity and/or person that did not
directly employ the worker liable for the wage violation. The major

213. See id.
214. See id. at 34.
215. See id.
216. See GARMENT WORKERS COLLABORATIVE, supra note 202, at 19.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 20.
220. See id. at 26.
221. See Bradstreet v. Wong, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253, 257 (Ct. App. 2008).
222. See id. Wong and Quan were unique among garment manufacturers. They owned several
million-dollar properties in San Francisco and had the means and ability to pay any judgment
against them. See Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement, Dep‟t of Indus. Relations, State Labor
Commissioner Pays Nearly $1 Million in Back Wages to Garment Workers, 2 CAL. LAB.
COMMISSIONER BULL., no. 2, at 2.
223. Interview with Marci Seville, Dir., Women‟s Employment Rights Clinic of Golden Gate
Univ. Sch. of Law, in S.F., Cal. (Jan. 2010).
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limitation of AB 633 is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Commissioner in enforcing the guarantee.
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING FRAMEWORKS
Holding shareholders and corporate actors personally liable for
corporate debts is neither a novel nor untested theory. Yet, the existing
frameworks have done little to deter noncompliance with wage and hour
laws. The problem lies both in the scope and breadth of individual
corporate liability and enforcement.
A. Enforcement and Coverage of the FLSA
While the FLSA has been lauded for its expansive coverage, the
law falls far short of covering all workers. The FLSA has a host of
exemptions, which carve out certain workers from the protections of
minimum wage and/or overtime laws.224 These exemptions are broader
than state wage and hour laws, exempting not only certain executive,
administrative, and professional employees but also outside sales
employees, home health care companions, and computer analysts to
name a few.225 The result is that large classes of low-wage workers are
not covered under the FLSA.226
Furthermore, FLSA‟s individual corporate liability centers on
operational control. The singular focus on control fails to reach a whole
host of employment relationships that rely on sub-contracting.227
Garment, construction, and janitorial industries, for example, are
structured such that control is diffused through several entities.228 Those
at the top of the sub-contracting hierarchy dictate the conditions and
price structures that result in violations at the bottom. 229 The control test
may not reach far enough up the chain to hold accountable those that set

224. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2006). There are two types of
coverage under the FLSA—individual and enterprise. See id. §§ 203(a), (r)(1). Under enterprise
coverage, only those businesses “whose annual gross volume of sales . . . [are] not less than
$500,000” have to comply with the FLSA. See id. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). Individuals who do not work
for a covered enterprise may still be covered if they are engaged in or produce goods involved in
interstate commerce. Id. § 207(a)(1).
225. See id. § 213.
226. Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 375 (2008).
227. See id. at 378-79.
228. See id. at 381-82.
229. See id. at 378-83.
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the conditions for wage violations.230
Compounding the limits of the FLSA‟s scope and coverage, DOL
enforcement has been hampered by insufficient funding, lack of focus on
enforcement, and ineffectiveness.231 From 1975 to 2004, the budget for
DOL‟s Wage and Hour Division (“WHD”) investigators decreased by
14% and enforcement actions decreased by 36%.232 The decrease in
funding and shift in agency focus from enforcement to monitoring has
resulted in serious impediments to enforcing the FLSA.
The
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) found that the WHD
enforcement actions from 1997-2007 decreased by one-third, and
enforcement actions were generally limited to individual complaints
instead of entire industries where violations were suspected.233
Furthermore, WHD failed to utilize the full panoply of remedies at its
disposal, including assessing penalties.234 Finally, the WHD failed to
maximize its outreach programs to inform workers of their rights under
the FLSA.235
In 2009, the GAO released a report on the inability of WHD to
adequately investigate complaints from low-wage workers.236 “Posing
as fictitious complainants, the GAO filed 10 common complaints with
WHD district offices across the country. The undercover tests revealed
sluggish response times, a poor complaint intake process, and failed
conciliation attempts, among other problems.”237
The GAO
investigation concluded that low-wage workers cannot rely on the DOL
to effectively assist them in recovering wages.238 The Wins workers
certainly felt that way after the DOL settled their wage claims for far
230. See id. at 380 (“Many companies seek to shift all employment-related responsibility . . .
[by claiming] that they do not employ the workers and that the labor contractor is solely
responsible.”).
231. See id. at 375-76.
232. See id. at 376. WHD of the DOL is charged with enforcing the FLSA, including
conducting investigations based on worker complaints. See, e.g., U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-08-962T, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, BETTER USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES
AND CONSISTENT REPORTING COULD IMPROVE COMPLIANCE (2008) (reviewing the inadequacies of
the WHD‟s enforcement).
233. U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-962T, supra note 232, at 15-16.
234. See id. at 11.
235. See id. at 2.
236. See U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-458T, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR:
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION‟S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW
WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT (2009). Under Hilda Solis‟ leadership, the DOL is
attempting to revamp the agency‟s focus. See News Release, Wage and Hour Division, US Labor
Secretary Sends Message to America‟s Under-paid and Under-protected: „We Can Help!‟ (Apr. 1,
2010), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/WHD20100411.htm.
237. U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-458T, supra note 236.
238. See id. at 24-25.
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less than their value and failed to recover any of the monies from Wong
and Quan.239
Workers are thus left to enforce violations of FLSA on their own—
a daunting task for low-wage and immigrant workers. Most low-wage
workers face significant barriers to effective redress. Lack of access to
counsel is one major obstacle.240 Low-wage workers cannot afford to
hire private attorneys on an hourly rate. Furthermore, their individual
cases are often too small to attract representation on a contingency fee
basis.241
The nature of the FLSA class action is a further impediment for
low-wage workers. Unlike discrimination claims under Title VII, the
FLSA has an “opt-in” provision for collective action.242 In essence,
workers must affirmatively give consent to be included in any collective
action.243 For many low-wage workers, the fear of reprisal from their
employer and lack of understanding of the class notice prevents them
from participating in FLSA class actions.244 As a result, the FLSA optin provision results in lower participation by workers.245
Because effective enforcement by DOL and individual workers is
relatively scarce, corporations and individual corporate actors have very
little to fear. Thus, even the expansive definition of employer under
FLSA has done little to deter wage and hour violations.
B. Judicial Limits on State Definitions
While some states adopted definitions similar to FLSA to reach
individual corporate actors, the state judiciary has been uncomfortable
with attempts to override the limited liability rule. Not surprisingly,
where states have broad language holding corporate individuals liable,
239. See Lazarus, supra note 15.
240. See STATE BAR OF CAL., ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 7 (2008).
241. See id. For example, two out of three low-income clients in California with meritorious
cases are turned away by attorneys for representation. Id.
242. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). To proceed in a class
action lawsuit under Title VII, the party must meet certain class requirements. See generally Gen.
Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (“Title VII . . . contains no special authorization for
class suits maintained by private parties. An individual litigant seeking to maintain a class action
under Title VII must meet „the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
of representation‟ specified in Rule 23(a).”). Once the court certifies the class, all putative class
members are included in the class unless they affirmatively opt-out. See FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(2)(B)(v).
243. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 226, at 386.
244. Id. at 387.
245. See id.
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courts have swiftly narrowed the scope of such expansive language.246
But even where the language is more precise, state courts have curtailed
or disregarded the plain statutory language.
For example, in
jurisdictions that specifically enumerate officers and agents in the
employer definition, courts read into the statute limiting language so that
only high-ranking officers or only those officers who knowingly
permitted the violation were liable.247
Recently, a spate of state supreme court decisions have undermined
principles of statutory construction and required extraordinary intent by
the legislature to override limited liability. In Leonard v. McMorris,248
the en banc Colorado Supreme Court addressed the scope of liability
under the Wage Claim Act for corporate officers and agents.249
Notwithstanding the unambiguous statutory language, the majority
engaged in a lengthy and unnecessary review of the legislative history,
comparing employer definitions in other state jurisdictions, and
expounding on traditional corporate law.250 The majority concluded that
the legislature did not specifically manifest its intent to override the
common-law limited liability rule.251

246. For example, Illinois has two provisions for imposing individual corporate liability.
Employer is defined to include any person acting “directly or indirectly in the interest of the
employer.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/2 (West 2008). Furthermore, Illinois explicitly deems
as employers any officer or agent who knowingly permits violations of the act. Id. at 115/13. As to
the first definition, the Illinois Supreme Court found the definition untenable and wholly
disregarded it. See Andrews v. Kowa Printing Corp., 838 N.E.2d 894, 898 (Ill. 2005).
247. See, e.g., Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund of Phila. v. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279,
282 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that at a minimum, high-ranking officers are within meaning of the
statutory definition); Mohney v. McClure, 568 A.2d 682, 686 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), aff’d per
curiam, 604 A.2d 1021 (Pa. 1992) (holding that only officers who had an active role in the decisionmaking liable); Dumas v. Infosafe Corp., 463 S.E.2d 641, 645 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
only agents or officers of a corporation who knowingly permit violations of the act are liable even
though statute imposes liability generally on officers and agents).
248. 63 P.3d 323 (Colo. 2003).
249. See id. at 326. The Colorado Wage Claim Act defines employer to mean “every person,
firm, partnership, association, corporation . . . and any agent or officer thereof, of the above
mentioned classes, employing any person in Colorado.” COLO. REV. STAT. §8-4-101(5) (2009).
Former employees of one of the largest privately held trucking companies sued the corporate
officers under the statutory definition of employer for $12 million in unpaid wages, benefits, and
other compensation. See Leonard, 63 P.3d at 325-26. The company filed for bankruptcy and
ceased operating. See id.
250. See Leonard, 63 P.3d at 326-32.
251. See id. at 333. The majority gave little credence to the fact that the Wage Claim Act was
amended in 1953 to add “agent” and “officer” to the definition of employer. See id. Furthermore,
prior Colorado court of appeals decisions found the legislature to have been unambiguous about
imposing individual corporate liability. See Cusimano v. Metro Auto, Inc., 860 P.2d 532, 534
(Colo. App. 1992) (“The definition of employer [in the Wage Claim Act] clearly discloses an intent
to impose personal liability for wages on corporate officers. It contains no express requirements for
liability beyond status as an officer.”).
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The McMorris decision greatly influenced the Nevada Supreme
Court‟s interpretation of its wage and hour definition of employer.252 In
Boucher v. Shaw,253 a group of casino workers filed a class action
lawsuit for unpaid wages against three officers and managers who
controlled either labor or financial matters at the casino.254 Extending
the rationale of McMorris, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that
the Legislature had not “unequivocally” expressed a specific intent to
extend liability to individual managers and agents.255 Thus, individual
managers could not be personally liable under the state wage and hour
laws.256
As discussed in the introduction, the California Supreme Court in
Reynolds interpreted its wage and hour employer definition to apply only
to administrative proceedings and not in civil litigation.257 The Labor
Code does not define the employment relationship, but it provides a
mechanism for private enforcement of unpaid wages including
overtime.258 California‟s minimum wage and overtime regulations,
called wage orders, do contain definitions that broadly define employ to
include “suffer or permit” and employer to include “any person that
directly or indirectly controls the wages, hours and working
conditions.”259
In Reynolds, the California Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff‟s

252. See Boucher v. Shaw, 196 P.3d 959, 962 (Nev. 2008). Nevada defines employer to
include “every person having control or custody of any employment, place of employment or any
employee.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.011 (2009). A person is defined as “natural person, . . . a
corporation, partnership, association, trust or unincorporated organization.” NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 0.039 (West 2008).
253. 196 P.3d 959 (Nev. 2008).
254. See id. at 960. The casino had filed for bankruptcy. See id. The Ninth Circuit certified
the question of corporate individual liability to the Nevada Supreme Court. Id.
255. See id. at 963. Originally, an employer was defined as “every person, firm, corporation, .
. . agent, manager, . . . or other person having control or custody of any employment, . . . or any
employee.” Id. at 961-62. In 1985, the legislature amended the statute to its current definition to
hold persons with control liable and, in turn, defined persons to include individuals and
corporations. Id. at 962. No legislative history existed explaining the adoption of the new
definition or why the legislature did not retain “agent” or “manager” in the definition. Id.
256. See id. at 960. On remand, the Ninth Circuit found that, while there was no individual
liability under the Nevada statute, the workers stated a claim under the FLSA for individual liability
and the casino‟s bankruptcy had no bearing on such individual liability. Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d
1087, 1091-93 (9th Cir. 2009).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27. Eight individual officers, directors and/or
shareholders were personally sued along with the corporation for unpaid overtime wages. Reynolds
v. Bement, 116 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Cal. 2005).
258. Reynolds, 116 P.3d at 1167 (observing that the Labor Commissioner is charged with
determining the employment status of individual claimants).
259. Id. at 1168.
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attempt to apply the wage order definition to his class action brought
under the Labor Code.260 The court found that the legislature had not
specifically expressed its intent to graft the wage order definition to the
Labor Code, despite the fact that the legislature amended the Labor Code
several times after the regulatory definition was adopted.261 Five years
later, the California Supreme Court in Martinez reversed itself by
holding that the wage order definitions did apply to Labor Code
proceedings.262 Martinez went further and stated that the wage order
definition of employer did not impose liability on individual corporate
agents acting within the scope of their agency.263 Reynolds, however,
never reached the scope of the regulatory definition, because it held that
the definition did not apply to the claim.264 Nonetheless, the California
Supreme Court in Martinez narrowed the scope of the wage order
definition to not reach corporate agents.
The judicial onslaught to defend the bedrock of corporate law
undermines legislative efforts to realign corporate interests with labor
rights. These decisions roll back vital worker protective legislation. The
concurrence in Reynolds urged legislative action to fix the legal gap in
coverage.265
V. THE NEED FOR GUARANTEEING WAGES
Individual corporate accountability for noncompliance with
minimum standards, which safeguard subsistence living, should be the
cornerstone of wage and hour legislation. The Federal Government and
the states have enacted significant worker protective legislation to
safeguard wages as special debts that must be paid promptly. These
statutory protections, however, are hollow without a remedy. When
businesses go bankrupt and corporate individuals are shielded from
liability, workers are vulnerable and left without a remedy.266
260. Id. at 1169.
261. See id.
262. See Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 279 (Cal. 2010).
263. Id.
264. See Reynolds, 116 P.3d at 1170.
265. See id. at 1174-75 (Moreno, J., concurring).
266. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006). The bankruptcy priority is an insufficient mechanism to
assist workers in recovering all of their wages. First, workers only have priority claim for a fraction
of the unpaid wages—those earned immediately prior to the bankruptcy. Id. § 507(a)(4) (noting that
employees are entitled to a priority claim in bankruptcy proceedings for up to $10,000 in wages
earned within 180 days of the bankruptcy filing.). Second, many corporations simply have no assets
for recovery, leaving workers unable to recover. See, e.g., Bradstreet v. Wong, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d
253, 262 n.8 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing corporate “shell games”). Such was the case for the Wins
factories. See id. at 257.
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During the long struggle to establish minimum wage standards, the
Supreme Court finally realized that the burden of wage exploitation fell
on society:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position
with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless
against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their
health and well being but casts a direct burden for their support upon
the community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are
called upon to pay . . . . The community is not bound to provide what
267
is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.

The same rationale applies to workers who have no bargaining
power to leverage personal guarantees or other premiums for the risks of
limited liability. Corporations pay no price for the risks they undertake,
forcing society to shoulder the burden when they fail. Thus, efforts must
be directed at restructuring the very mechanism that deprives workers of
their ability to recover wages.
Because of the relative low bargaining power of the low-wage
worker and the high noncompliance in low-wage industries with basic
minimum standards, this Article proposes an expansion of the AB 633
guarantor system to other low-wage industries, with an explicit
mechanism for private enforcement. The wage guarantee is no different
than a contract creditor requiring, in certain circumstances, personal
guarantees in their corporate dealings. Because low-wage workers have
no real bargaining power, Congress and the states should secure wage
guarantees through legislation.
The legislation should include a few key mechanisms that are not
currently in the AB 633 model. To have the greatest breadth of
coverage, legislation should target low-wage industries. Low-wage
industries can be identified as those employing front-line workers (nonsupervisors, non-professional, non-technical workers) who earn less than
85% of the median wage in their area.268
Furthermore, the wage guarantee should not be limited to minimum
wage workers. The government identifies low-wage workers as those
who earn below the poverty line for a family of four, even if they

267. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
268. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 56. While there are different methodologies used to
identify low-wage industries, the approach by Annette Bernhardt and her research team in the most
recent, comprehensive report on low-wage workers seems a sufficient means for identifying these
industries.
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worked full-time, full-year.269 Under the government‟s methodology, a
low-wage worker makes an hourly wage of $10.50 or less.270 Workers
who earn slightly more than minimum wage, but below the poverty line,
are subject to the same exploitation and face the same vulnerabilities as
minimum wage workers. Thus, the guarantee should encompass them.
The model language for the wage guarantee should be as follows:
To ensure that employees are paid for all hours worked, any person
who employs or contracts with another person for the performance of
goods or services shall guarantee payment of wages that are due to the
employees performing the work.

Furthermore, “person” should be defined as:
Any individual, firm, partnership, association, corporation, limited
liability company, or joint stock association. A person includes
shareholders, any person with equity interest, and directors and officers
of a corporation or limited liability company.

The wage guarantee for targeted low-wage industries will do more
to reform the flagrant disregard for basic minimum wage standards. If
individuals higher on the sub-contracting ladder are responsible for
guaranteeing that workers be paid their wages, it is easy to imagine that
better systems will be put into place to prevent or dissuade
noncompliance with wages.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nineteenth-century legislators protected creditors by instituting
varying degrees of unlimited liability for corporations. The early history
of unlimited liability, particularly as applied to workers‟ wages, has been
long forgotten. Because of political necessity, rather than economic
necessity, limited liability came to dominate legal jurisprudence.
Flawed reasoning as to who could bear the risks more efficiently—
creditor or investor—helped excuse the unfairness of the rule.
Aware of the possibilities for grave injustices to workers, Congress
and some states rewrote the common-law rule. The FLSA and some
state wage and hour laws explicitly hold corporate individuals personally
liable for wage violations. However, these existing structures‟ singular
focus on control fails to penetrate the structural problems in low-wage
269. WHO ARE LOW-WAGE WORKERS?, supra note 37, at 1.
270. Id. Using Annette Bernhardt‟s median wage methodology, a low-wage worker in New
York makes $13.07 or less. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 56.
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industries that ensure rampant wage and hour violations.
Corporate interests have long dominated the development of
corporate laws, undercutting other societal values. For workers,
especially those already toiling at the margins, the ability to recover their
earned wages should not hinge on the corporate structure. Two dual
conditions make this legislative reform a paramount necessity:
noncompliance with wage and hours laws has become rampant, and
corporate bankruptcies have steadily grown. Without legislative action
and a uniform standard across all jurisdictions, workers like the
immigrant women who worked at Wins will be left without any recourse
to recover the money that is owed to them.
The time for a simpler and more effective means to recover unpaid
wages is upon us. As California and earlier shareholder surety laws
demonstrate, a wage guarantee system is neither a novel nor untested
idea. Low-wage workers need assurance that they will be compensated
for their labor. Guaranteeing wages for these workers helps to rectify
the unfairness and inequity of the limited liability rule.

